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PAYMENTS 
WILLIAM J. BLACKFORD* 
“Over the past two decades, the Internet has revolutionized 
many aspects of business and society . . . . Yet the basic 
mechanics of how people and organizations execute 
transactions . . . have not been updated for the 21st century. 
Blockchain could bring to those processes the openness and 
efficiency we have come to expect in the Internet Era.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over 126 million Americans place their trust in the federal and state 
governments to provide and facilitate payment for their healthcare needs.2 
But this trust is levied upon a system plagued with a dearth of integrity; 
where roughly $25 million is stolen every hour, expenditures are rising faster 
than the pace of inflation, and the bureaucracy is working frantically to fend 
off insolvency in these publicly managed health programs.3 While the United 
States has maintained a rapidly increasing growth rate in health spending, the 
fifteen-year survival rate4 in America is the lowest among our international 
counterparts.5 The entitlement programs of the past—long heralded as heroic 
endeavors—now teeter on the edge of extinction.6 
It should come as no surprise that the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) has consistently classified Medicare and Medicaid as “high 
risk” programs.7 The federal government, through the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), is the single largest payer for health 
services in the United States.8 CMS spent over $984 billion in 2015.9 For 
Medicare alone, improper payments accounted for 12.1% of the program’s 
                                                 
 2. As of 2015, over 55 million Americans are covered by Medicare, with over 71.6 
million beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. See 
Press Release, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jul. 28, 2015), https://www.cms
.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2015-Press-releases-items/2015-07-
28.html. 
 3. REBECCA S. BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD: AUDITING AND DETECTION GUIDE 2 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
 4. See Peter A. Muennig & Sherry A. Glied, What Changes in Survival Rates Tell Us 
About US Health Care, 29:11 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2107 (2010), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/29/11/2105.full.pdf+html (explaining that measuring the fifteen-year survival rate 
can be preferable to using a life expectancy measurement due to the prevalence of coding 
errors for a small number of elderly individuals which can bias life expectancy calculations). 
 5. See id. (for example, by 2005, fifteen-year survival rates for forty-five-year-old 
U.S. white women were lower than in twelve comparison countries with populations of at 
least seven million and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of at least 60% of U.S. per 
capita GDP in 1975). 
 6. See PATRICIA A. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE: INSOLVENCY 
PROJECTIONS (Oct. 5, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20946.pdf (“The 2016 Medicare 
trustees’ report projects that, under intermediate assumptions, the [Hospital Insurance] Trust 
Fund will become insolvent in 2028, two years earlier than estimated in the prior year’s 
report.”). 
 7. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN 
UPDATE 8 (Feb. 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf. 
 8. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS ROADMAPS OVERVIEW (2016), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/
QualityInitiativesGenInfo/Downloads/RoadmapOverview_OEA_1-16.pdf. 
 9. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS FAST FACTS, https://www.cms.
gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/CMS-Fast-
Facts/index.html. 
2018] HASHING IT OUT 221 
total spending, representing $43.3 billion in wasted federal funds.10 Such 
improper payments occur, inter alia, when federal funds are distributed for 
medical care or services that were not covered by CMS regulations, were not 
medically necessary, or were billed for but never provided.11 Shortcomings 
in the design, engineering, and implementation of health information 
technology (“IT”) systems,12 coupled with administrative complexity13 have 
led to a healthcare system that struggles with data interoperability and 
integrity. 
A similar issue of integrity exists in the financial industry. The 
transition into the digitization of cash led to the development of the “double 
spending” enigma. Once currency involves digital ledgers, electronic 
manipulation becomes possible.14 If a user makes a copy of a digital coin 
before they spend it, they have the possibility to spend that coin again. In 
November 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto published a white paper15 that introduced 
a new electronic payment system aimed at remedying the double-spending 
problem: Bitcoin.16 
Since Bitcoin’s arrival, many of the most impressive developments 
surrounding the innovation have not involved the cryptocurrency itself; 
instead, the data structure underlying Bitcoin—a decentralized ledger 
                                                 
 10. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDICES FOR THE 
MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 2015 IMPROPER PAYMENTS REPORT (2015), https://www.cms.
gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-
Compliance-Programs/CERT/Downloads/AppendicesMedicareFeeforService2015
ImproperPaymentReport.pdf. 
 11. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-204, 
§ 2(e), 124 Stat. 2224, 2227 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3321 note) (“The term ‘improper 
payment’— ‘(A) means any payment that should not have been made or that was made in an 
incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory, contractual, 
administrative, or other legally applicable requirements; and (B) includes any payment to an 
ineligible recipient, any payment for an ineligible good or service, any duplicate payment, 
any payment for a good or service not received (except for such payments where authorized 
by law), and any payment that does not account for credit for applicable discounts.’”). 
 12. See e.g., Arthur L. Kellermann & Spencer S. Jones, What it Will Take to Achieve 
the As-Yet-Unfulfilled Promises of Health Information Technology, 32:1 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
(2013) at 64, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/1/63.full.pdf+html (“Large, 
integrated delivery systems such as the Department of Veterans Affairs and Kaiser 
Permanente provide enterprisewide electronic health records, but the information stored in 
those records is essentially useless if the patient seeks out-of-network care.”). 
 13. See Dhruv Khullar & Dave A. Chokshi, Toward an Integrated Federal Health 
System, 315:23 JAMA 2521 (June 21, 2016), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-
abstract/2519644 (“The breadth, complexity, and incremental development of the federal 
health system have resulted in a fragmented patchwork, with many potential areas for 
integration to increase efficiency and improve care coordination.”). 
 14. See University of Birmingham Lecture: Digital Cash (Jan. 3. 2007), http://www.cs
.bham.ac.uk/~mdr/teaching/modules06/netsec/lectures/DigitalCash.html. 
 15. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN.ORG, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH 
SYSTEM 4 (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 16. Tristan Mazer, Bitcoin: A Worldwide Currency? 3 (July 2015) (unpublished 
Bachelor thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam), https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/30037/Bachelor-
Thesis-Final-Tristan-Mazer-376526.pdf. 
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technology known as the Blockchain17—has been a pivotal and provocative 
technological advancement.18 The blockchain structure has attracted the 
attention of stakeholders across a wide spectrum of industries, from finance19 
and real estate,20 to utilities21 and healthcare.22 Much of blockchain’s appeal 
derives from its ability to enable trustless networks, i.e., where parties can 
conduct business and process transactions even in an environment void of 
mutual trust.23 The blockchain data structure, when utilized in certain 
transactional settings, replaces the “trusted” intermediary with a system that 
preserves data integrity and operates in a decentralized fashion, removing the 
need for central authority without compromising functionality or certainty.24 
Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) 
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
(“ONC”) launched a “Blockchain Challenge,” soliciting white papers “that 
investigate the relationship between Blockchain technology and its use in 
Health IT and/or Health Related research.”25 On September 1, 2016, ONC 
selected fifteen winning white papers.26 Not surprisingly, the majority of the 
                                                 
 17. For purposes of this Note, the upper-case “Blockchain” will be used in reference to 
Bitcoin’s specific decentralized ledger, while the lower-case “blockchain” will reference the 
general data structure class known as decentralized ledger technology (“DLT”). Throughout 
this Note, the terms “blockchain” and “DLT” will be used synonymously to reference this 
new breed of data structure. 
 18. See Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution: How the Technology 
Behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business, and the World (2016), excerpt reprinted in 
Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Here’s Why Blockchains Will Change the World, FORTUNE 
(May 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/why-blockchains-will-change-the-world 
(“The new platform enables a reconciliation of digital records regarding just about 
everything in real time. In fact, soon billions of smart things in the physical world will be 
sensing, responding, communicating, sharing important data, doing everything from 
protecting our environment to managing our health.”). 
 19. See generally Victor Li, Bitcoin’s Useful Backbone Blockchain Technology Gains 
Use in Business, Finance and Contracts, 102 ABA J. 31 (March 2016). 
 20. See generally U.S. Patent App. No. 20160035054, Systems & Methods for 
Managing Real Estate Titles & Permissions (filed July 28, 2015). 
 21. See generally Lynne L. Kiesling, Implications of Smart Grid Innovation for 
Organizational Models in Electricity Distribution, WILEY HANDBOOK SMART GRID DEV. 
(forthcoming 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2571251. 
 22. See generally Ariel Ekblaw, et al., A Case Study for Blockchain in Healthcare: 
“MedRec” Prototype for Electronic Health Records & Medical Research Data, ONC 
BLOCKCHAIN CHALLENGE (Aug. 2016), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/5-56-
onc_blockchainchallenge_mitwhitepaper.pdf.  
 23. Konstantinos Christidis & Michael Devetsikiotis, Blockchains and Smart 
Contracts for the Internet of Things, IEEE ACCESS 2292, 2292 (May 10, 2016). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Announcing the Blockchain Challenge, OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR, 
https://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/blockchain-challenge (“The goal of this Ideation 
Challenge is to solicit White Papers that investigate the relationship between Blockchain 
technology and its use in Health IT and/or health-related research.”). 
 26. See ONC Announces Blockchain Challenge Winners, OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR, 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/08/29/onc-announces-blockchain-challenge-
winners.html. 
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papers focused on such issues as patient privacy,27 health record security,28 
and institutional interoperability29—all of which are viable issues in need of 
workable and sustainable solutions.30 What was surprising was the absence 
of winning papers focused on a solution to the rampant abuse, wastefulness, 
and fraud underlying our federally-funded healthcare programs. Although 
many of the “Blockchain Challenge” papers proposed bold moves for the 
healthcare regulatory system, they tended to focus on a broad spectrum of 
exciting blockchain possibilities, with little consideration of the relative 
importance of potential solutions in light of current practicalities. Yet, the 
everyday challenges facing federal decisionmakers—such as the 
insurmountable federal debt31 and gridlock on costly innovation—require a 
cost-benefit-based prioritization of blockchain applications.32 
Blockchain will likely lead to a revolution in the realm of American 
healthcare.33 But entrepreneurs and federal regulators desiring 
implementation of this promising technology must refrain from trying to 
reshape problems to fit a blockchain solution. Instead, they should start by 
identifying the problems that have the greatest potential for either recouping 
or saving federal dollars, and then decide whether blockchain is a viable 
integration to the overall solution. To that end, this Note examines improper 
                                                 
 27. See e.g., Allison A. Shrier et al., Blockchain & Health IT: Algorithms, Privacy, 
and Data, White Paper (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/1-78-
blockchainandhealthitalgorithmsprivacydata_whitepaper.pdf. 
 28. See e.g., Ariel Ekblaw et al., supra note 22 at 2 (proposing a “novel, decentralized 
record management system to handle EHRs, using blockchain technology”). 
 29. See e.g., Ramkrishna Prakash, Adoption of Block-Chain to Enable the Scalability 
& Adoption of Accountable Care (Aug. 2016), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
13-71-blockchain_for_healthcare_paper_final.pdf (arguing for “the adoption of a new 
process for care delivery that requires the coordination of a “network” of care providers who 
can engage in shared risk contracts”). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See Fiscal Outlook: Federal Fiscal Outlook, U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
http://www.gao.gov/fiscal_outlook/federal_fiscal_outlook/overview (“Moving forward, the 
federal government will need to make tough choices in setting priorities and ensuring that 
spending leads to positive results.”). 
 32. See id. (“Closing the [fiscal] gap requires spending reductions, increases in 
revenue, or, more likely, a combination of the two.”). 
 33. Jim Manning, Blockchain Can Revolutionize Every Aspect of Healthcare, 
ETHNEWS (Oct. 28, 2016), http://ethnews.com/blockchain-can-revolutionize-every-aspect-
of-healthcare. 
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payments34 under Medicare,35 an area of federal healthcare spending in which 
corrective measures consistently yield significant returns on investment,36 
and then surveys the underlying features of blockchain technology, 
proposing a basic blockchain solution accompanied by an endogenous 
regulatory roadmap to guide its implementation. 
Part I highlights the inadequacies and inefficiencies of our Medicare 
payment system, focusing on the initiatives currently in place and the 
susceptibilities that persist. Part II offers a broad overview of the 
development, importance, features, and collateral technologies surrounding 
blockchain. Part III posits that Congress and HHS, through its various 
subsidiary agencies, should work in tandem with private stakeholders to 
create and/or implement a blockchain-based infrastructure to facilitate 
federal healthcare payments and support future growth of quality-based 
initiatives. This Note concludes with a recommendation for future agency 
research focusing on the viability and cost efficiency of a blockchain 
solution. 
I.  THE MEDICARE MALADY 
Medicare serves as the primary federal mechanism for payment of 
nongovernment-furnished healthcare services.37 Its colossal influence stems 
not only from its sheer size in the marketplace, but also its 55-year track 
record of transforming indemnity health insurance through research and 
demonstration.38 Medicare’s clout in the realm of healthcare payments can 
also be its greatest weakness, as even the smallest changes and inefficiencies 
                                                 
 34. The term “improper payments” is very broad and it is apparent that blockchain 
will not be a viable solution for every wasteful, abusive, and fraudulent transaction that can 
be classified under said term. Additionally, when capitalized, “Improper Payments” has 
various implications as defined in statutes. But the solutions proposed in this note focus on 
those improper payments that primarily occur due to inefficiencies and structural enigmas, 
rather than fraudulent situations that, currently and in the foreseeable future, require human 
intervention (e.g., Stark Law and Anti-Kickback violations). Hereinafter, the use of the term 
“improper payments” in this Note is meant as a reference to only these non-human, 
structural inefficiencies. 
 35. Although Medicaid fraud is also a serious issue, the interconnection of federal and 
state programs adds immense complexity to any solution. This Note focuses on Medicare 
due to the primarily federal control over the program and the issue of improper payments 
associated with the program. 
 36. See e.g. OIG News Release (Feb. 14, 2012), http://wayback.archive-
it.org/3926/201501 21155547/http:// www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/02/20120214a.html 
(“[T]he government’s health care fraud prevention and enforcement efforts recovered nearly 
$4.1 billion in taxpayer dollars in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011.”). 
 37. AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, MEDICARE LAW 1 (Thomas W. Coons et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 2012). 
 38. Stanley B. Jones, Medicare Influence on Private Insurance: Good or Ill? 18 
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 153, 153 (1996), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC4193643/pdf/hcfr-18-2-153.pdf. 
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can have drastic effects on the entire healthcare system.39 Unfortunately, 
Medicare’s current inefficiencies are anything but small. 
The recent Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was an attempt to drive 
private provider and payer behavior through payment incentives, which were 
anticipated to save Medicare spending from the impending cost increases 
across the industry.40 However, policymakers are concerned that the ACA’s 
focus on incentivizing provider efficiency will lead to rationing, similar to 
HMOs in the 1980s and 1990s when patients were denied care due to similar 
financial incentives that accompanies such health plan management.41 The 
recent political regime change adds further uncertainty to the realm of 
healthcare policy and the ACA’s longevity.42 
Legislators and policymakers believe the answer to this problem is 
quality reporting, which has admittedly improved over the past twenty 
years.43 But even with these incentives and improved metrics, the Medicare 
system is still overwhelmed by fraud and inefficiency.44 To further 
complicate the matter, CMS has delegated the bulk of Medicare’s 
administration and oversight to non-federal contractors.45 Under this system, 
the HHS Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) recently discovered that CMS 
had over 6,000 Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) contracts, totaling 
over $25 billion, that were not closed out as required under the FAR.46 In the 
same audit, OIG found that CMS had “15 percent of contracts that were 
completed before FY 2011 at least 10 years overdue.”47 
These are not examples of simple human oversight. These blunders 
are structural in nature and require an overhaul of the technology underlying 
the inefficiencies. Obviously, such technical renovations cannot occur to 
each separate system simultaneously or in a hasty manner. Thus, this portion 
of the Note is dedicated to examining the systematic inadequacies to find a 
starting point that is not only in need of innovation, but one which has a high 
potential return on investment. 
                                                 
 39. Id. (“Medicare must be closely monitored because even relatively small changes 
can have large short-term effects in the aggregate.”). 
 40. THE GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE REFORM: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 226 (Daniel 
B. McLaughlin ed. 2015) [hereinafter THE GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE REFORM]. 
 41. Id. at 228. 
 42. See MJ Lee & Tami Luhby, Trump Issues Executive Order To Start Rolling Back 
Obamacare, CNN (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-signs-
executive-order-on-obamacare/. 
 43. See THE GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE REFORM, supra note 40, at 228. 
 44. Id. 
 45. HHS OIG Semiannual Report to Congress 1 (October 1, 2015 – March 31, 2016), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/semiannual/2016/SAR_Spring
_2016.pdf (“Medicare contractors are responsible for administering more than one-half of a 
trillion dollars in benefits each year.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (“Because the closeout process is generally the last chance for improper 
contract payments to be detected and recovered, delays in the closeout process pose a risk to 
Government funds.”). 
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A.  Defining the Ailment 
Before analyzing any solution, one must first understand the 
evolution, scope, and future implications of the present problem. To be sure, 
it may be impossible to sufficiently define the Medicare “problem” given the 
sheer size of the program and the countless intricacies inherent in more than 
fifty years of development and expansion. The best jumping-off point may 
be a broad assessment of the American healthcare model that is so heavily 
influenced by Medicare policy and functionality. 
As one author explains, the business of delivering healthcare has at 
least three distinguishing characteristics: 
[1] the centrality of a relationship predicated upon trust 
between a professional healthcare provider and a patient; [2] 
the unique potential for vulnerability and compromised 
judgment on the part of a patient who views her physician 
first and foremost as an advocate for and guardian of her best 
interests; [3] and the myriad, integrated issues of cost, 
quality, and access related to a finite supply of medical 
services and providers—all against the backdrop of a 
fundamental good, i.e., public health, necessary for the 
community to flourish.48 
Immediately apparent is the juxtaposition of trust and integration 
with vulnerability and necessity. 
Americans have great confidence in their personal physicians, but 
are unimpressed with the overall performance of the health care system.49 
Yet, this confidence may be unfounded. Under the fee-for-service (“FFS”) 
Medicare system, “providers routinely omit indicated procedures of known 
value, they frequently perform treatments and surgeries that are unnecessary 
and inefficacious, and treatment patterns vary widely and for no good 
reason.”50 CMS recognized the prevalence of such practices and has initiated 
a move away from the fee-for-service model to a value-based care (“VBC”) 
system for Medicare reimbursement.51 Currently, about 30% of Medicare 
                                                 
 48. Joshua E. Perry, For Patients and Profits: Ethical Astuteness and the Business of 
Dialysis, 2 BELM. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (2014) (citing Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy
 Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient Relationship in the Era of Managed 
Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995)) (emphasis added). 
 49. David A. Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, 46 PERSP. BIO. & MED. 
55, 56 (2003). 
 50. Id. at 57. 
 51. Better Care. Smarter Spending. Healthier People: Paying Providers for Value, 
Not Volume: Where We Are Now, CMS (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/
MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-01-26-3.html. 
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FFS payments are in some way tied to quality.52 CMS has the goal of tying 
85% of all Medicare fee-for-service to quality or value by 2016, and 90% by 
2018.53 
Unfortunately, the actual payment system for such services—
whether they be based on volume or value—is entirely inefficient. A deluge 
of incompatible payment schemes, preadmission certification metrics, and 
regulatory directives severely throttles the fiscal efficacy of the Medicare 
payment system.54 The 2014 Improper Payments Report indicated that 
Medicare FFS payment accuracy rate55 was 87.3%,56 which only slightly 
improved to 87.9% in 2015.57 Between July 2013 and June 2014, Medicare 
paid an estimated $43.3 billion58 for payments that were not covered by 
Medicare, improperly coded, or in violation of billing rules.59 
To make matters much worse, the safety mechanisms currently in 
place to identify and reclaim these improper payments depend on third-party 
contractors, such as the Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”)60 for FFS 
payments, that work on a contingency-fee basis.61 RACs are tasked with 
                                                 
 52. Letter from John Shatto, Director, Medicare & Medicaid Cost Estimates Group, to 
Rahul Rajkumar, Deputy Director, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Mar. 
3, 2016), https:// innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/ffs-apm-goalmemo.pdf. 
 53. Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals — HHS Efforts to 
Improve U.S. Health Care, 2015 N. ENGL. J. MED. 897 (2015), http://www.nejm.org/doi/
full/10.1056/NEJMp1500445?query=featured_home&. 
 54. See THE GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE REFORM, supra note 40, at 272. 
 55. The term “accuracy rate” refers to the percentage of Medicare FFS dollars paid 
correctly. 
 56. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
2014 IMPROPER PAYMENTS REPORT 1 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/CERT/CERT-
ReportsItems/Downloads/AppendicesMedicareFee-for-Service2015ImproperPayments
Report.pdf. 
 57. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
2015 IMPROPER PAYMENTS REPORT 1 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/CERT/
Downloads/MedicareFeeforService2015ImproperPaymentsReport.pdf. 
 58. See id. at 4 (showing an overall total of $43.3 billion in incorrect payments for 
2015 report). 
 59. See id. at 2 (“CERT contractor reviewers could not conclude that the billed 
services were actually provided, were provided at the level billed, and/or were medically 
necessary”). 
 60. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STATEMENT OF WORK FOR THE 
RECOVERY AUDIT PROGRAM 2, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-
Program/Downloads/090111RACFinSOW.pdf (“Section 302 of the Tax Relief and Health 
Care Act of 2006 requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(the Secretary) to utilize Recovery Auditors under the Medicare Integrity Program to 
identify underpayments and overpayments and recoup overpayments under the Medicare 
program associated with services for which payment is made under part A or B of title XVIII 
of the Social Security Act.”). 
 61. Id. at 36 (“The Recovery Auditor will only be paid a contingency payment on the 
difference between the original claim paid amount and the revised claim paid amount.”). 
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recovering overpayments and underpayments to providers under the FFS 
framework by auditing medical records and Medicare claims up to three 
years after the provision of services.62 For every denied claim, a RAC earns 
up to a 12.5% commission on his or her recovery total.63 This payment 
structure incentivizes RACs to deny even the most appropriate claims.64 In 
one region, of those claims that providers appealed, approximately 98% of 
the RAC-identified overpayments under Medicare Part B were ultimately 
found to be valid payments.65 
Speaking of appeals, the HHS Office of Medicare Hearings and 
Appeals (“OMHA”) found that from 2011-2013, the claim and entitlement 
workload for its sixty-five Administrative Law Judges grew by 184%, 
accumulating a backlog of 460,000 claims.66 In 2009, an appeal took an 
average of 94.9 days to process.67 By the third quarter of 2016, the average 
processing time for an appeal was 935.4 days.68 Given the current state of 
Medicare appeals, it is no surprise that, when a RAC issues a finding of 
improper payment under Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 
based on the patient’s assigned “status,” some hospitals opt to forego an 
appeal and, instead, submit a Part B inpatient hospital claim.69 And statistics 
reveal that providers rarely pursue appeals at all.70 
While critics of Medicare may be able to appreciate the causes of 
many of these complex issues, there are some issues for which even Medicare 
supporters have a hard time reconciling. Year after year, Medicare continues 
to remit payment to dead beneficiaries, totaling $23 million in 2011 alone.71 
                                                 
 62. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CONGRESS’ LETTER TO THE HONORABLE 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS 1 (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.aha.org/content/14/140210-let-congress-
hhs.pdf. 
 63. Bob Herman, Medicare and Medicaid RACs in FY 2012: 8 Statistics, BECKER’S 
HOSP. CFO REP., (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/medicare-
and-medicaid-racs-in-fy-2012-8-statistics.html. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Office of Inspector Gen., Medicare RACs and CMS’s Actions to Address 
Improper Payments, Referrals of Potential Fraud, and Performance, Appendix A, 21 (Aug. 
2013), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-11-00680.pdf. 
 66. See CONGRESS’ LETTER, supra note 62, at 1. 
 67. Average Processing Time by Fiscal Year, OMHA, http://www.hhs.gov/about/
agencies/omha/about/current-workload/average-processing-time-by-fiscal-year/index.html. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Jessica L. Gustafson & Abby Pendleton, Healthcare Providers and Suppliers 
Eagerly Anticipate Planned Improvements to Recovery Audit Program, 11 ABA HEALTH 
ESOURCE, no. 6 (Feb. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health
_esource/2014-2015/february/providers.html. 
 70. Alan J. Goldberg & Linda M. Young, What Every CEO Should Know About 
Medicare’s Recovery Audit Contractor Program, 56 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 157, 159 
(2011), http://aboutams.com/images/uploads/news/Trends-GoldbergYoung-JofHM_May-
June_11.pdf. 
 71. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICARE PAYMENTS MADE ON BEHALF OF DECEASED 
BENEFICIARIES IN 2011 13 (Oct. 2013), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-12-00130.pdf 
(“CMS has safeguards to prevent and recover Medicare payments made on behalf of 
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Similarly, Medicare consistently fails to ensure that illegal immigrants do not 
receive CMS funds, improperly paying nearly $9.3 million to unlawfully 
present individuals in 2013 and 2014.72 While these findings shy in 
comparison to the billions in overall wasted Medicare funds, they do 
illuminate one of Medicare’s overarching operational struggles: the entire 
system is built on a pay-and-recover model instead of a preemptive approach. 
Instead of detecting improper claims and anomalies prior to payment, the 
efficiency of the Medicare program depends primarily on post-payment audit 
and recovery initiatives, the majority of which are carried out by third-party 
contractors working on commissions.73 Many HHS programs are attempting 
to tackle the improper-payment conundrum. But as long as they are 
structurally stuck with the low-ground, post-payment position, their 
offensive measures to recover lost funds will prevent them from ever gaining 
control of the situation. 
B.  Examining Current Initiatives 
The federal government is aware of Medicare’s payment failures and 
has pursued innumerable avenues for correcting the deficiencies. The most 
comprehensive attempt to fight fraud in federal healthcare programs is the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).74 When 
Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996, it expanded the scope of healthcare fraud 
and abuse prevention in numerous ways.75 First, HIPAA created the first 
secure source of federal funding to combat healthcare fraud.76 Second, 
HIPAA increased the enforcement power of the federal government by 
                                                 
deceased beneficiaries; however, it inappropriately paid $23 million in 2011 after 
beneficiaries’ deaths.”). 
 72. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICARE IMPROPERLY PAID MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
FOR UNLAWFULLY PRESENT BENEFICIARIES FOR 2013 AND 2014 i, (Sept. 2016), https://
oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region7/71501159.pdf (“The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
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made for Medicare services rendered to unlawfully present beneficiaries, which resulted in 
$9.3 million of improper payments in 2013 and 2014.”). 
 73. To be sure, Medicare and RACs do have some prepayment tools, such as the 
National Correct Coding Initiative (NCCI) Edits, Medically Unlikely Edits (MUEs), and 
Medical Review (MR). See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIM 
REVIEW PROGRAMS 5 (Sept. 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/MCRP_Booklet.pdf. 
 74. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2012)) [hereinafter HIPAA]. 
 75. See Philip Hilder & Lon Mullen, HIPAA: Time for a Health Care Corporate 
Compliance Program, 45 FED. LAW. 34 (1998) (examining HIPAA’s context and 
implications). 
 76. The Act allocated nearly $120 million for fiscal year 1997 with a 15% increase 
each fiscal year until 2003. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A COMPREHENSIVE 
STRATEGY TO FIGHT HEALTH CARE WASTE, FRAUD & ABUSE (2000), http://archive
.hhs.gov/news/press/2000pres/20000309a.html [hereinafter HHS COMPREHENSIVE 
STRATEGY]. 
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establishing programs to coordinate efforts and facilitate prosecution of 
healthcare fraud, waste, and abuse at both state and federal levels.77 
Additionally, HIPAA created the Medicare Integrity Program (“MIP”) which 
authorizes HHS to enter into contracts with private entities to carry out 
Medicare investigational activities,78 including fraud and abuse detection, 
utilization review, education, audits, provider payment determinations, and 
recovery of improper payments.79 
Section 911 of the Medicare Modernization Act (“MMA”) of 2003 
required CMS to reform its Medicare contracts by replacing fiscal 
intermediaries and carriers with Medicare Administrative Contractors 
(“MACs”) that will handle both the Part A and Part B programs in specified 
geographic regions.80 MACs issue transmittals, bulletins, notices, and 
general instructions to providers in their designated areas to facilitate the 
administrative tasks of the Medicare program.81 Working within the 
regulatory and statutory requirements, MACs have broad discretion to 
establish particular guidelines and procedures for remitting Medicare 
payments, including local coverage determinations, prior approval, 
utilization limits, specific documentation requirements, and the like.82 
However, MACs must adhere to various cost and performance standards83 
because consistently poor performance may lead to termination of their 
contract with HHS.84 
The ACA was another progressive step toward solving the improper 
payment issue. Section 3021 of the ACA established the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation (“Innovation Center”) and appropriated $10 billion 
to support the Innovation Center through 2019.85 The mission of the 
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CONTRACTORS 2, 10 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 670/669947.pdf. 
 84. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 83, at 10; see also THOMAS C. 
FOX ET. AL, HEALTH CARE FIN. TRANSACTIONS MANUAL § 17:1, 954 (2016). 
 85. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HHS FY2015 BUDGET IN BRIEF, CMS: 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION (2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/
budget/fy2015/budget-in-brief/cms/innovation-programs/index.html. 
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Innovation Center is to test “innovative health care payment and service 
delivery models with the potential to improve the quality of care and reduce 
Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP expenditures.”86 While the Innovation Center 
has leeway with many of its initiatives, Congress also assigned the program 
numerous specific models to implement, such as models for improvement in 
care delivery and payment and for the monitoring of Medicare 
effectiveness.87 
HHS’ commitment to reducing the incidence of improper payments 
should not be understated. It is exploring and implementing new measures to 
focus on prevention, with some initiatives focused on clarifying and 
simplifying policy, while others aim for more individualized education 
through more focused reviews.88 However, before the preventative measures 
can truly have an impact, it is essential for HHS “to accurately account for 
where, how, and why these improper payments occur.”89 Answering such 
inquiries is a skill that HHS still struggles to acquire.90 
C.  Identifying the Vulnerabilities 
Current approaches to detection and prevention of improper 
payments have seen some success, but they still function within a 
transactional architecture that, as a whole, suffers from serious vulnerabilities 
and inadequacies. In America’s modern healthcare system, “the currency is 
data.”91 Although we live in an age where data is constantly created92 and 
more readily available than ever before, the traditional structure of the 
healthcare marketplace hinders access to and transmutation of data.93 
Services received in the marketplace are disconnected from the payment for 
such services.94 Healthcare providers frequently lack sufficient data on 
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 87. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, ABOUT THE CMS INNOVATION 
CENTER (2016), https://innovation.cms.gov/About/index.html. 
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 90. See James Swann, Medicare Dinged for Failing to Lower Payment Error Rates, 
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 93. See Peter Chawaga, Blockchain and Health Care’s Future, NASHVILLE POST MAG. 
(Dec. 8, 2016). 
 94. Id. 
232 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5: 219 
patients due to inefficiencies in—or utter lack of—interoperability between 
doctors and information systems.95 
Underlying these issues is a regulatory agenda focused on 
transitioning to quality-based care.96 The healthcare system was originally 
designed to facilitate episodic care, treating illnesses and injuries as they 
occur and reimbursing providers on a fee-for-service basis.97 The majority of 
Medicare payments to physicians and hospitals are still primarily transacted 
on the volume of care provided, “with little or no emphasis on the quality or 
value of that care.”98 Studies have shown, however, that a higher volume of 
care does not equate to better or more effective care for patients.99 Statistics 
such as these prompted legislators of the ACA to adjust the trajectory of care 
toward a system of value-based payment initiatives.100 
Experimentation with new, value-based alternatives has been met 
with significant practical difficulties. First, there’s the issue of defining and 
measuring “value” and “quality.”101 There are innumerable complexities 
inherent in any measurement of value or quality; and, when combined with 
the high level of subjectivity involved, it is nearly impossible to create a 
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.edu/cfm/education/PDF/Wennberg_Article.pdf. 
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patients.” In higher-spending regions, more patients are hospitalized more frequently and see 
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in regions with relatively fewer medical resources. See Elliott Fisher et al., Health Care 
Spending, Quality, and Outcomes: More Isn’t Always Better, DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH 
POL’Y & CLINICAL PRAC 2 (2009), http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/
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 100. See Santo, supra note 97, at 1383. 
 101. Id. at 1395. 
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uniform standard that will apply effectively and equally across America’s 
diverse population.102 Second, assuming the creation of a reasonable standard 
for quality care was practicable, the next challenge is the translation of 
quality measures into meaningful financial incentives.103 
Even more important, for purposes of this Note, is the challenge of 
aggregating useful data necessary for facilitating a quality-based approach, 
and the difficulty of translating, exchanging, verifying, and updating such 
data.104 A prerequisite for the success of any value-driven payment system is 
health information technology (“HIT”)105 that has widespread 
interoperability.106 For over a decade,107 the federal government has 
endeavored to develop a HIT architecture that will enable a national 
exchange platform for electronic health information.108 Notwithstanding 
significant progress from many public and private collaborations focused on 
building a suitable framework and standards for adoption of interoperable 
HIT, the goal of widespread implementation is still a work in progress.109 
Despite these numerous impediments that frustrate the departure 
away from the fee-based system, the current regulatory scheme has set a goal 
that, by the end of 2018, 50% of all Medicare payments be made through 
alternative payment models, such as value-based payments.110 If this goal is 
to become a reality, it is paramount for CMS—and other HHS entities—to 
“develop appropriate cost and quality measures, to attribute these measures 
to the appropriate providers, and to collect the necessary data in a cost-
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effective way.”111 To do so, there must be a database structure in place that 
will allow for the necessary uptake of data capture and storage without 
sacrificing the integrity, functionality, or confidentiality of such health 
information. 
II.  A BIT ABOUT BLOCKCHAIN 
Hope for a data solution to alleviate the strain of Medicare improper 
payments may exist in the form of a promising new ledger technology. On 
October 3, 2016, hundreds of technology and healthcare innovators 
congregated in Nashville, Tennessee, for the first-ever conference on 
blockchain and its potential to revolutionize the healthcare industry.112 The 
conference accompanied the explosion of blockchain technology in 2016 
across industries that rely on data; which is so say, nearly every industry.113 
But any discussion of blockchain requires a basic understanding of the 
origins of its use in facilitating the transmission of digital currencies—the 
first, and most famous of which, is Bitcoin. 
Put simply, Bitcoin is an electronic system facilitating payments 
from one party to another without the use of a financial intermediary, e.g., a 
bank.114 More technically, “Bitcoin is an open source digital currency.”115 
Advocates of Bitcoin frequently claim that it is as revolutionary today as 
were personal computers in 1975 and the Internet in 1993.116 Despite 
Bitcoin’s popularity—or, to some, infamy—the Blockchain system upon 
which it is built has erupted from its humble and abstract birth to gain 
notoriety for its lucrative potential as a practical data solution.117 
The use cases for this cryptographic marvel go far beyond the 
financial realm. Blockchain “offers a way for people who do not know or 
trust each other to create a record of who owns what that will compel the 
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assent of everyone concerned. It is a way of making and preserving truths.”118 
While blockchain technology nears the peak of the Hype Cycle,119 business 
and governments around the world are engineering new ways to utilize this 
revolutionary data structure.120 
Section A of this Part gives a brief overview of Bitcoin as a means 
of understanding the political and systemic undercurrent of blockchain. 
Then, Section B introduces the broader classification in which blockchain 
belongs: distributed ledger technologies. Finally, Section C explores related 
concepts that are integral to and have developed alongside blockchain 
systems. 
A.  The Bitcoin: Birth of the Blockchain 
As with most technologies, to more fully understand and appreciate 
blockchain, it is useful to view it in the context of its origins and initial 
applications. Bitcoin is a burgeoning virtual currency121 that, unlike 
traditional currencies, is not backed by a government or private institution 
and is without specie, such as coin or precious metal.122 Instead, Bitcoin’s 
operation relies on peer-to-peer networking and advanced cryptography.123 
Blockchain’s conception can be traced back to the 1990s, when a 
group of libertarian idealists began tinkering with the idea of cryptography 
as a solution for achieving privacy.124 As described by its founder, Satoshi 
Nakamoto, 
[Bitcoin is] completely decentralized, with no central server 
or trusted parties, because everything is based on crypto 
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proof instead of trust. The root problem with conventional 
currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work. The 
central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency, but 
the history of Fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust. 
Banks must be trusted to hold our money and transfer it 
electronically, but they lend it out in waves of credit bubbles 
with barely a fraction in reserve. We have to trust them with 
our privacy, trust them not to let identity thieves drain our 
accounts . . . With e-currency based on cryptographic proof, 
without the need to trust a third-party middleman, money 
can be secure and transactions effortless.125 
Since its inception in 2009, Bitcoin has facilitated approximately 
62.5 million transactions between 109 million accounts.126 The daily 
transaction volume, as of March 2015, was more than 200,000 bitcoins, 
which represents nearly $50 million at market exchange rates, with a total 
market value of $3.5 billion for all bitcoins in circulation. 127 The total amount 
of Bitcoins is capped at 21 million, creating resource scarcity that drives the 
price-setting market forces.128 
The transactional system underlying Bitcoin is the cornerstone of its 
immense popularity and speedy adoption. In any digital transaction of 
currency or goods—let’s call them “coins”—there is an expectation that, 
when the owner of the coins agrees to transfer them to a different owner, the 
recipient will remit to the sender the expected product or service in return.129 
The transactional model is destabilized if a sender is able, upon receipt of the 
expected product or service, to transmit a contradictory transaction that sends 
the same coin back to the sender.130 This common loophole—known as a 
“double-spending attack”—allows an attacker to first confirm a transaction 
with a merchant, and then convince the transactional network to accept an 
alternate exchange, leaving the merchant without product or coins and the 
attacker with both.131 The sum of the problem is synchronization: a need for 
an indication of transactional finality that thwarts conflict between 
transactions.132 
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Through a “proof-of-work” (“POW”) process, Bitcoin’s 
transactional structure provides protection against double-spending 
attacks.133 In the Bitcoin POW system—referred to as “mining”—data is 
replicated and shared across a decentralized network.134 This is where the 
Blockchain arrives, housing the authoritative ledger of transactions to 
establish exactly who owns what.135 To better explain the Blockchain, it is 
helpful to walk through the steps of a Bitcoin transaction. 
First, Bitcoin utilizes a public key infrastructure (“PKI”) mechanism. 
The use of public addressees and private keys is central to the functionality 
of bitcoin.136 Each user is assigned a pair of public and private keys.137 In the 
same way that banks identify a person’s account through a unique series of 
numbers, an alphanumeric string—known as a public key—serves as the 
outward-facing destination address for an individual’s Bitcoin account or 
“wallet.”138 Like most bank accounts that have a PIN or a password, each 
Bitcoin owner has a private key for authorizing transfer of Bitcoin to the 
public address (i.e. from one wallet to another).139 Each Bitcoin is really just 
a chain of digital signatures. Thus, the Bitcoin transaction consists of a coin 
owner digitally signing over the history of a coin (a cryptographic “hash” of 
its previous transactions) to the public key of the next owner, all of which is 
added to the coin’s string of historical transactions.140 
Second, after approximately ten minutes, the transaction is written in 
a block. Each block references a previous block by including in its header the 
authentic identification hash of the earlier block. Thus, the blocks form a 
chain: the very first block—the “genesis block”—as the primary root, and 
each subsequent block as a child of the block that it references.141 The entire 
chain of blocks, including the time-stamped information regarding every 
transaction ever made, are recorded on the disk storage of the so-called 
“miners”.142 
Third, the miners validate the correctness of new, incoming 
transactions by comparing them to the ledger of the previous block and its 
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information.143 Instead of a purely democratic model of validation, the 
Bitcoin network utilizes a puzzle-solving process.144 Miners are 
incentivized145 to expend significant computational effort to solve complex 
mathematical problems in order to process the validation request.146 This 
POW process is intended to protect against the “Sybil attack”, where a single 
entity could seize control of the network and influence the data structure to 
favor its interests.147 When the miners successfully confirm all the 
transactions, a distributed consensus exists—a unique, authoritative, 
transactional chronology.148 
As with any disruptive innovation, the positive aspects of Bitcoin 
must be weighed against a number of potential downsides. As one scholar 
explained, 
The benefits for users of Bitcoin include user anonymity, 
low transaction costs, no foreign exchange fees, greater 
financial inclusion (e.g. those who may not be able to 
acquire traditional banking services), and not being subject 
to the influence of central authority or governments like 
traditional currencies. Drawbacks for Bitcoin users include 
price volatility, technological dependence, potential for 
losses due to hacking, no FDIC backing, no recourse due to 
the anonymity (e.g. refunds, exchanges), and the ability to 
finance illicit activity. The current market for Bitcoin 
compared to the broader economy is small, but growing.149 
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Understanding Bitcoin in the transactional sense can assist with 
visualization elements necessary for contemplating other applications of the 
underlying structure. But Bitcoin is only the first implementation of 
blockchain technology as a tool of distributed consensus. Blockchain itself is 
where the true value for the healthcare industry lies. 
B.  The Backbone: Decentralized Ledger Technologies 
Although blockchain technology was introduced alongside Bitcoin 
as a solution to the double-spending problem,150 the blockchain data structure 
has independent significance aside from its cryptocurrency counterpart. 
Basically, blockchain is like an operating system (“OS”) and Bitcoin is but 
one program running on top of the OS framework. And just as Windows, 
Mac, and Linux are each different forms of operating systems, the 
Blockchain is only one varietal of a class of technologies known as 
decentralized public ledgers.151 Regulatory activity has, nevertheless, 
focused chiefly on the virtual currency applications of the decentralized 
ledger technology (“DLT”), with a majority of such attention on Bitcoin.152 
From a broad perspective, the Blockchain is simply one form of a 
DLT; a distributed, tamper-proof public ledger of time-stamped transactions. 
The technology can be used to share this ledger of transactions across a 
network of users without control by any single entity. A DLT simplifies the 
creation of “cost-efficient commercial relationships where virtually anything 
of value can be tracked and traded without requiring a central point of 
control.”153 Trust is established on a DLT through mass collaboration and 
ingenious technological design—not through the traditional intermediaries, 
e.g., banks and private companies.154 To secure the data involved and ensure 
privacy of such transactions, the DLT enables a cryptographic one-way 
hashing process to “tokenize” the identities of the transactional 
participants.155 
Many projects have followed in the footsteps of the Blockchain, 
building upon the central premise by expanding functionality and versatility 
for innumerable applications across a spectrum of industries.156 These 
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projects have mainly followed three approaches when building advanced 
applications: using scripting on top of an existing blockchain, engineering a 
meta-protocol on top of an existing blockchain, or engineering an entirely 
new blockchain.157 The third option—engineering a new blockchain—grants 
developers “unlimited freedom in building a feature set, but at the cost of 
development time, bootstrapping effort and security.”158 
Ethereum is an example of an initiative that built a new DLT for the 
purpose of expanding the possibilities for the blockchain model.159 Ethereum 
is a “programmable blockchain” that incorporates many of the same features 
and technologies of the Bitcoin Blockchain while forging a new level of 
adaptability and flexibility.160 Specifically, Ethereum is designed to allow 
creation of complex solutions that integrate “smart contracts,”161 which are 
discussed in detail below. 
Blockchains are just the jumping-off point for the future of DLT and 
have prompted corporations and governments to reimagine the entire 
architecture and infrastructure of the evolving digital world. In many cases, 
centralized networks remain a preferred solution.162 But the industries that 
have the most to gain from the DLT revolution are those that depend on 
centralized authority and trusted intermediaries to facilitate transactions—
such as the healthcare system.163 
C.  The Buzz: Collateral Concepts 
Just as Bitcoin is only one possible application built on the 
Blockchain system, there is an innumerable variety of DLT applications, 
most of which have no direct relation to virtual currency or the financial 
industry.164 As discussed above, regulatory initiatives have primarily focused 
on payment and currency applications for DLTs. This is problematic, 
however, because strict regulations have the potential to hamper even those 
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DLT applications that do not fit a financial services model.165 An 
examination of these collateral technologies illustrates the need for 
differentiation and specialized treatment based on the particular function and 
purpose of such applications. For purposes of this Note, there are two 
collateral concepts that would likely play a large role in any blockchain 
solution for federal healthcare payments: smart contracts and sidechains. 
Smart contracts166 are one of the most talked-about DLT applications 
in the legal industry, and for good reason. Smart contracts use distributed 
databases to allow parties to “confirm that an event or condition has in fact 
occurred without the need for a third party.”167 The result is “digital, 
computable contracts where the performance and enforcement of contractual 
conditions occur automatically, without the need for human intervention.168 
A smart contract is created when traditional contract terms are coded 
and uploaded to a DLT.169 This produces a decentralized, digital agreement 
that does not rely on an intermediary for recordkeeping or enforcement.170 
Contracting parties are thus enabled to structure their relationships more 
efficiently, forging self-executing deals that are void of any linguistic 
ambiguity.171 Additionally, whenever real-world data triggers a certain 
condition in a smart contract (e.g., the price of a particular stock at a given 
time) agreed-upon external systems—known as “oracles”—can be 
developed to keep track of such triggers.172 Many of these contractual triggers 
will be measured by Internet enabled devices and relayed through machine-
to-machine communications, the facilitation of which will rely on the 
underlying DLT.173 
For example, a Los Angeles wholesale meat distributor (A) enters 
into a smart contract with a Japanese Kobe beef producer (B). The underlying 
contract code conditions automatic payment from A’s bank account into B’s 
account upon the following: (i) the beef will be loaded on the cargo vessel 
prior to [X timestamp], (ii) the temperature of the beef will remain between 
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[specified range], and (iii) land carrier will deliver to A’s warehouse at 
[specified coordinates]. Utilizing the Internet of Things,174 various internet-
enabled devices will follow the shipment and upload data to the DLT. One 
of B’s employees will verify delivery to the vessel via a handheld device. A 
GPS locator on the product packaging, along with the ship’s GPS device, will 
confirm that the location of the beef matches the location of the vessel. A 
wifi-enabled thermometer accompanying the product will track the 
temperature along the voyage. If the meat temperature deviates from the 
specified range, the smart contract will not remit payment from A to B. The 
digital contract will likewise refuse payment if any of the other variables fall 
outside the set parameters, such as the shipment arriving to the vessel late.175 
Currently, smart contract applications are still in their infancy, with 
the majority of actual uses limited to the automatic execution of derivatives, 
futures, swaps, and options.176 But the research and development of use cases 
is growing exponentially.177 Numerous projects are aiming to develop smart 
contract programming languages to facilitate the creation of increasingly 
sophisticated and diverse agreements.178 
Sidechains are another example of innovation that has resulted from 
the development and expansion of DLT.179 Over the years, the Bitcoin 
ecosystem has grown tremendously. With this growth came concerns that the 
Blockchain network was not expanding at a sufficient rate due to a cap on 
the allowable block size. It was out of these concerns that the concept of a 
sidechain emerged.180 
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In basic terms, “[a] sidechain181 is a blockchain that validates data 
from other blockchains and enables bitcoins and other assets to be transferred 
between blockchains, fostering a new, open platform for innovation and 
development.”182 Engineers of sidechains can structure them in such a way 
as to increase the level of centralization, allowing for a greater degree of 
permissioned use and control of transactions on the sidechain.183 Sidechains 
also allow communication and transactions to occur between two or more 
blockchains, while also permitting a greater degree of experimentation 
without the need to create an entirely separate structure.184 
Smart contracts and sidechains increase the viability of decentralized 
applications by expanding the possibilities for applications in nearly every 
data-dependent industry. Smart Contracts emulate the responsibilities of a 
trusted administrator, improving the transparency of data and protecting the 
integrity of transactions from manipulation.185 Sidechains work in concert 
with other systems and blockchains, creating “the opportunity for new 
models of trust” and a potential platform for the development of interoperable 
protocols.186 
Given its general-purpose data structure, the blockchain technology 
and the innovations that surround it are not limited to the financial industry. 
Healthcare is an industry that suffers from many of the very maladies and 
inefficiencies187 that blockchains are intended to remedy. If approached in an 
inclusive and collaborative manner, blockchain applications may restore trust 
and forge interoperability within the federal healthcare payment 
infrastructure, along with providing for the evolution in data collection and 
transmutation necessary for the shift from volume to value. 
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III.  A THEORY OF TOGETHERNESS 
While scholars and innovators have proposed numerous potential use 
cases for blockchain in healthcare,188 the growth of DLTs has developed 
alongside a transition in political power and a regulatory agenda that will be 
focused on cost-effectiveness.189 The notion of cost-benefit analysis in the 
healthcare industry has been consistently rejected by legislators190 due to the 
negative implications associated with cutting or limiting federal healthcare 
entitlement programs.191 Thus, regulators tend to focus on measures that will 
decrease inefficiencies and waste. But any novel technological solution, if it 
is to be successful in gaining approval through the political process, must be 
grounded in efficiency and cost-effectiveness.192 
As such, this Note approaches the potential use of blockchain as a 
solution for the healthcare industry by focusing on a persistent problem in a 
“high risk” arena which, by its very nature, lends itself to a data-driven 
solution: Medicare improper payments. The issue of improper payments is 
one that centers around a lack of data integrity, due in part to a structure that 
fails to provide effective interoperability between providers and payers. This 
Note proposes the creation of a permissioned Ethereum blockchain network, 
the implementation of which will involve a three-step legislative and 
administrative process.193 
Section A of this Part details the basic ideation for a federal 
blockchain system that will enable transactions involving federal healthcare 
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entitlements, facilitate more efficient payments, and support further 
implementation of quality-based initiatives. Section B sets forth necessary 
implementation steps for Congress and HHS. Section C details the strengths 
and weaknesses of any application of DLT within the Medicare claims and 
payment infrastructure. 
A.  Ideation of a DLT Solution 
The solution that this Note proposes is not a complete elucidation or 
a precise algorithmic Band-Aid to heal the festering wound of Medicare 
improper payments, nor is it meant to be a quick or convenient fix. Instead, 
it is a functional approach to healthcare payment regulation and architecture 
that takes into account the ever-evolving nature of the industry and disruptive 
technologies. By leveraging existing blockchain technologies and 
interoperability standards, the proposed solution involves a three-stage 
process: (1) creating the foundational blockchain system, (2) engineering 
various applications on top of the blockchain, and (3) structuring the data 
relationships.194 
For a blockchain solution to exist, a threshold requirement is 
deciding which blockchain to utilize, or whether it is more practical to create 
an entirely new chain. Each option has its benefits and pitfalls, but the 
ultimate decision should be based on the same cost-effectiveness analysis 
that drives the overall solution. Thus, although this Note maintains that a 
solution built upon the existing Ethereum blockchain will most likely be the 
most cost-effective option, Congress and HHS may discover—through the 
solicitation of proposals—that creation of a separate blockchain is either 
more efficient or otherwise desirable over any DLT that currently exists. 
Ethereum stands out among the other blockchains for three main 
reasons. First, although it has a cryptocurrency195 underlying the data 
structure, it was specifically built to be a next-generation, decentralized 
application platform.196 Second, the Ethereum network has superior 
scalability due to a block time197 that is significantly faster than Bitcoin’s 
Blockchain and an anticipated processing capability of 10,000 transactions 
per block.198 Third, Ethereum allows for more elaborate data encryption 
techniques, such as zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic encryption to 
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ensure data security.199 These features translate into a blockchain foundation 
that will facilitate faster transaction speeds with larger transaction volume 
and a greater degree of protection against security incidents—all of which 
will be vital to the exchange of data to process federal healthcare payments. 
The second step for the setup of the solution architecture, regardless 
of the regulatory choice as to the type of blockchain foundation, involves 
engineering the necessary applications that will layer on top of the 
blockchain. An issue that must be taken into account prior to any 
development of the applications is the determination as to which parties will 
have access to the application. Initially, there are three groups of stakeholders 
that will most likely need access: government, providers, and contractors. 
The government and provider access is obvious given they are the two parties 
transacting business. But contractors, such as CMS contractors and 
healthcare clearinghouses, will also require access due to their crucial role in 
facilitating the processing and auditing of claims and payments. In the future, 
assuming the blockchain solution is successful, new applications may be 
integrated, or the original application altered, to expand access to groups such 
as patients200 and private payers.201 
Once access is decided, smart contracts need to be created and 
integrated. These smart contracts will contain the logic required to automate 
the terms and conditions that predicate payment between the government 
entitlement programs and the provider based on the particular patient’s 
eligibility and coverage. These smart contracts, once implemented on the 
blockchain, are automatically executable and will be fully transparent to the 
stakeholder groups.202 The submission of a claim by a provider will correlate 
with the smart contracts in place between that provider and the federal 
government and will autonomously apply the most up-to-date payment 
metrics to the transaction. 
Such an exchange of claim information must be premised on the 
existence of sufficient security structures and protocols. Two security 
measures are proposed that will provide the necessary level of data privacy 
and security. First, the patient and provider identities will be “tokenized” 
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through a cryptographic one-way hash that is similar to the Bitcoin 
blockchain method.203 As one scholar described, 
An example of the patient inputs would be “Health Plan 
Company Identifier + Member Id + DOB + First Name + 
Last Name”. Tokenizing these properties would allow for 
patients to be uniquely identified by the health plan and 
provider. Using this design, a patient’s token would change 
as the health plan information changed so one user is not 
tightly coupled to the same token. Loose coupling reduces 
the impact of a security breach because a compromised 
token would be limited to a specific time range.204 
The second security measures involves structuring the storage and 
access mechanisms in a manner that keep the majority of a patient’s private 
and identifying health information on traditional databases.205 This data will 
then be associated with the tokenized identities on the blockchain, which will 
serve as a doorkeeper and administrator.206 By using “off-chain” storage of 
sensitive health information with access granted via a secure hash function 
stored on the blockchain, both the data at rest and access to such data will 
remain secured.207 
The third phase of development centers around organizing the duties, 
relationships, and permissions of stakeholders in relation to the utilization, 
creation, alteration, and dissemination of data. While the first two phases 
implement the basic structure necessary to perform the basic government 
healthcare payment transaction, the purpose of the third phase is to setup a 
regulatory and contractual scheme that will support current initiatives and 
future innovation. This will require collaborative decision-making to reach a 
consensus on various questions surrounding the flow of information, such as 
the specific data elements permitted on the blockchain and a set of uniform 
audit-logging functions. Although this third phase is crucial to any workable 
solution, it is hard to predict how such relationships should be structured at 
such an early stage of blockchain development. Thus, while the third stage is 
briefly mentioned here, the ultimate actors—from both the public and private 
spheres—are yet to be determined, but their symbiosis will be invaluable to 
creating a sustainable and viable solution. 
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 205. See C. Brodersen et al., Blockchain: Securing a New Health Interoperability 
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B.  Regulatory Implementation 
To accomplish the three-phase development of the proposed 
blockchain solution, Congress and the various agencies under HHS should 
follow a corresponding three-step regulatory roadmap. First, Congress 
should pass a legislative measure requiring HHS and its subsidiary 
agencies,208 through negotiated rulemaking,209 to engineer—and promulgate 
rules governing—a blockchain solution for federal healthcare payments. 
Second, HHS and its relevant subsidiaries should solicit a request for 
proposals (“RFP”) regarding the creation of a blockchain substrate, 
collaborating with the industry leaders to devise the requisite applications for 
implementing a workable and scalable blockchain system. Third, these same 
regulators will need to work with existing contractors and clearinghouses to 
develop the standards underlying security and exchange of health data. 
The overarching theme of this regulatory path challenges the 
traditional dichotomy between self-regulation210 and government regulation. 
The emergence of DLT applications in healthcare is likely to involve a 
situation where neither regulatory choice effectively incentivizes industry 
stakeholders to prevent the market and governance failures that are of 
primary concern to regulators. State regulation is likely to take an 
increasingly aggressive approach by imposing dramatic regulatory barriers, 
even when the ultimate goal is aimed at alleviating current pitfalls in the 
system. And self-regulation may take an overly hands-off approach that will 
open the door to more fraud and abuse of the DLT solution. This Note 
suggests an alternative course based on the hybrid approach of endogenous 
regulation. 
An “endogenous211 model of regulation” encourages lawmakers to 
engage in a concerted effort to administer “from within and without, and 
sidesteps the ex ante/ex post regulatory choice by building compliance into 
the protocol and thereby eliminating the need for incentives.”212 The three-
step process highlighted above encourages regulation to be endogenously 
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fused into the DLT213 and its related applications by allowing regulators to 
initiate a statutory scheme and implement that statute through programming 
code, all while engaging in a continually cooperative venture with industry 
leaders and the core developers of the DLT technology.214 
While not without its critics,215 the negotiated rulemaking procedure 
has been seen by many as a useful tool in the regulatory arsenal for dealing 
with complex and divisive issues, especially when its focus is targeted and 
properly calibrated to avoid adversarial tension.216 Negotiated rulemaking 
can be beneficial in allowing an agency to flesh-out important issues prior to 
the devotion of significant time and resources to rule drafting.217 Given the 
technical expertise that is required for writing of code within the limitations 
of the relevant protocol, regulators must necessarily rely on assistance from 
stakeholders in the DLT ecosystem.218 Formulating rules through consensus 
also increases the likelihood that interested stakeholders will “buy-in” to the 
final solution by fostering opportunities for give-and-take discussions.219 
Additionally, having been required by Congress under the ACA to utilize the 
negotiated rulemaking process,220 the consensus-based regulatory approach 
is not a novel concept for HHS. 
The endogenous theory may similarly benefit the other stages of 
implementation. Collaboration is inherent in the course of RFP solicitation, 
which synthesizes cost effectiveness with creativity by allowing an agency 
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to choose a solution that is both innovative and practical.221 Further, both 
ONC and CMS have extensive experience with contracting out support 
services and working in partnership with the private sector to find answers to 
everyday problems.222 In retaining these endogenous dynamics while also 
forging new levels of cooperative engagements, the federal government can 
use the development of a healthcare payment solution as an opportunity to 
lay a fertile DLT substrate upon which other agencies may build new 
solutions for other intricate data issues. 
C.   Strengths and Weaknesses of an Endogenously-Engineered 
DLT Solution 
Like every technology, DLT has limitations and is not suited for 
every possible application; there are many hurdles that any solution will face. 
By focusing through the lens of Medicare improper payments, the strengths 
and weaknesses of a blockchain solution can become apparent. Although an 
exhaustive list is far removed from the scope of this Note, the following 
points highlight a few of the most prominent pros and cons underlying a 
blockchain remedy. 
Numerable benefits arise when applying blockchain’s inherent 
features, especially in the context of taming improper payments under 
Medicare.223 The decentralized, immutable, stakeholder-to-stakeholder 
ledger can alleviate the interoperability issues that the ONC has been fighting 
since its inception. The validation of data integrity through the POW model 
drastically reduces administrative costs by reducing the need for certain 
auditing intermediaries, leaving more resources available for the prevention 
and recovery of improper payments. Automated smart contracts can be coded 
to integrate logic that fulfills the promulgated regulatory standards. This will 
facilitate real-time claims adjudication that incorporates a heightened degree 
of privacy and security due to the cryptographic tokenization of identities and 
the ability to keep the majority of private data and records off the main 
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blockchain. The features seem to counter the main structural issues that lead 
to improper payments, such as the temporal lag in the claims process and 
inconsistent data variables. Blockchain can also lend itself to the level of 
scalability necessary to expand the value-based payment initiatives that focus 
on quality metrics. 
There are certainly intrinsic limitations associated with the 
blockchain model.224 The costs of building, maintaining, and utilizing a 
blockchain system will be significant. For instance, the mining process that 
is necessary to incentivize transaction processing requires a small fee for each 
transaction that is paid to the node for validating the integrity of a block of 
transactions.225 Although initial gaps in blockchain adaptability are being 
further closed with each new day of development, there remain challenges in 
integrating new DLT solutions with corporate legacy architectures and 
record systems.226 And one of the greatest assets of blockchain—the 
“creation of a permanent, immutable ledger of transactions”—may also have 
its limitations in instances where real-world healthcare transactions demand 
that certain data be removed from the record.227 
Nevertheless, there is a steady stream of new use cases for 
blockchain solutions in the healthcare industry arising each day.228 
Blockchain’s open, decentralized, and immutable characteristics have 
sparked excitement in healthcare when considering the potential impact on 
verifying patient identities and managing the vast ocean of health records.229 
These same features, coupled with the functionality of sidechains and 
computational logic of smart contracts, make a blockchain-enabled solution 
an ideal candidate for automating the processing and payment of Medicare 
claims.230 Overall, as blockchain emerges from its infancy, “it has the 
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potential to standardize secure data exchange in a less burdensome way than 
previous approaches.”231 
This Note encourages regulators to thoroughly evaluate these 
benefits and pitfalls, and promptly invest in the research necessary to 
determine the viability of a blockchain answer to the improper-payment 
problem. The openness and efficiency of the DLT structure offers a 
promising path to real-time auditing and fraud prevention that can remedy 
the existing overhead of collecting, aggregating, and exchanging healthcare 
information. Perhaps the most daunting hurdle that lies ahead is the 
uncertainty regarding cross-industrial regulation of such technologies and the 
acceptance of a blockchain solution by institutions that are greatly invested 
in outdated mechanisms and a healthcare system that is slow to change. 
CONCLUSION 
The blockchain revolution coincides with the shifting paradigms of 
healthcare as a whole. Although scholars have proposed many exciting use 
cases to exploit the benefits of blockchain, few have approached the topic by 
first identifying a pressing issue of inefficiency lending itself to a solution 
that incorporates the novel characteristics of blockchain technology. This 
Note presents a functional, cost-effective, and collaborative approach to 
analyzing blockchain in the context of Medicare improper payments—a 
wasteful vulnerability in a high-risk government program. 
Rather than disseminating an overly technical or theoretical 
proposition, the solution presented herein was intentionally shaped to be 
flexible for an area of technology that will likely, within a short duration of 
time, evolve into an entirely different beast. Current CMS and ONC 
initiatives focused on quality-based care and interoperability are worthwhile 
endeavors. Yet, without approaching the solution from the ground up by 
restructuring the foundational framework through which federal dollars are 
paid for health services, the government will be promoting a cycle of 
shortcomings and fueling additional squandering of already depleting funds. 
Despite the tantalizing prospect of an all-encompassing DLT fix, technology 
is a fragment of the answer. But if properly harnessed and endogenously 
implemented, a blockchain system and its connected applications may 
ultimately achieve a solution that is both competent and efficient. 
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